The World’s Biggest Single-Day Election: on Indonesia’s Recent Elections
[General Prabowo Subianto] once mused to me about becoming ‘a fascist dictator’ and is now a serious threat to assume the presidency.1
Allan Nairn
THE MOST INTENSIVE SLAUGHTER SINCE THE NAZIS
On 14 February, General Prabowo Subianto — Indonesian Defense Minister and former military general, long since accused of human rights abuses over his role in the kidnapping of activists and the massacre of around one-third of East Timor’s population — declared his victory in the country’s recent presidential elections. The son-in-law of the former US-backed dictator, General Suharto, Prabowo is the heir of a banking family and holds hundreds of thousands of acres of plantation, mining, and industrial properties. In a 2014 report, “verified recently by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the former Army lieutenant-general provided a glimpse into his wealth, which is mostly derived from securities assets in 26 companies worth Rp 1.52 trillion and $7.5 million.” And despite having lost two, consecutive, presidential races (2014; 2019), Prabowo now finds himself supported by the outgoing president Joko Widodo (aka. Jokowi), who had privately discussed trying Gen. Prabowo “for war crimes.”2 As for Prabowo’s complicity in the war crimes committed under General Suharto’s military regime? This was how veteran journalist and survivor of the Dili Massacre (aka Santa Cruz Massacre) overseen by Prabowo himself, Allan Nairn4 described the extent to which Prabowo was an agent in the numerous instances of human rights abuses under the 32 year, US-backed, military dictatorship of Gen. Suharto
In 1975, after a meeting with President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, Suharto — with their weapons and go-ahead — invaded neighboring East Timor. There, the Indonesian armed forces killed one-third of the Timorese population. It was, in proportional terms, the most intensive slaughter since the Nazis. Prabowo […] was a senior commander of the massacres in occupied East Timor. In one, at Kraras in 1983 on the mountain of Bibileo, ‘several hundred’ civilians were murdered, according to a United Nations backed inquiry. Prabowo also personally tortured captives; one told [Nairn] of Prabowo breaking his teeth.”3
In 2001, Nairn conducted interviews with Gen. Prabowo on two occasions wherein the former raised the issue of the army’s massacres — including the massacre Nairn survived. Over the course of their conversations, Prabowo spoke of how “Indonesia is not ready for democracy,” while remarking that what the country needs is “a benign authoritarian regime.” Prabowo even went so far as expressing his support for military rule, praising Pakistani General Musharraf’s success in leading the country’s 1999 coup d’état while suggestively contemplating a similar strategy for Indonesia.
THE AMERICANS’ “FAIR-HAIRED BOY”
Having attended the Advanced Infantry Officers Course at Georgia’s Fort Benning in 1985 and the Army Special Forces Training Course at North Carolina’s Fort Bragg in 1980 — or what are today known as Fort Moore and Fort Liberty, respectively — Prabowo earned his reputation as the Indonesian military officer with the closest ties to the United States Military. “Prabowo described himself to me,” Nairn recounted, “as ‘the Americans’ fair-haired boy.’ He worked hand-in-glove with the U.S. as he carried out massacres, torture, and disappearances — so closely that his fellow officers, he said, sometimes mocked him as ‘the American.’” Despite such close ties, in 2000, Gen. Prabowo became the “the first case of someone denied a visa subsequent to the United States ratifying the Torture Convention,” given that the US administration suspected Prabowo as having a role in “kidnapping and torture” during the 1998 riots that brought an end to General Suharto’s military dictatorship. During the very month (May) in which these riots took place, The Washington Post published an article reporting how US officials believed “that an elite U.S.-trained military unit in Indonesia” was “involved in kidnapping and torturing political dissidents,” prompting the US to consider “a permanent ban on ties with the unit.” What is more, soon after a number of influential political activists began disappearing in the February of 1998,
…the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta, J. Stapleton Roy, met with Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, who headed the Kopassus special forces until March, to express U.S. anger over the disappearances and to request that Prabowo try to gain the activists’ release.5
Perhaps even more telling than Prabowo’s denial of entry into the very country that trained and continued to maintain close ties with his special forces units, and despite the US’ suspicion regarding Prabowo’s responsibility in the kidnappings and disappearances of Indonesian activists, US “officials tried to maintain good relations with Prabowo and Kopassus.” So much so that, even after the meeting between Prabowo and the US ambassador to Indonesia, US Special Forces troops held “three training exercises with [Prabowo-led] Kopassus — in March, April and May.” In 2012, Prabowo would once again be denied a US-visa and barred from entering the country due to the US administration’s continued suspicion of Prabowo’s role in the kidnapping of activists. However, Prabowo was recently granted a US-visa after the Trump administration lifted the de facto ban on his entry into the country. As part of Prabowo’s itinerary for this visit, he received “official briefings” related to Indonesia’s purchasing of US fighter jets. And, according to The Diplomat, by December 2020, “the deal was brokered during Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller’s visit to Jakarta this week, during which he met with his Indonesian counterpart Prabowo Subianto.”
Given Prabowo’s reputation and the already tenuous relationship between Indonesia and democratic proceduralism due to US-backed dictatorial rule, the country would only wade further into the murky waters of electoral politics: a mere one day after what has been dubbed “the world’s biggest single-day election,” two candidates who are projected as having lost in the regional vote (according to unofficial counts) urged the Indonesian parliament to carry out an inquiry into “irregularities” that may have compromised the integrity of Indonesia’s democratic process. Included among the allegations are “irregularities” concerning “voter intimidation, manipulation of state institutions, misuse of state resources […] during the campaign period to sway the election outcome.” While Reuters reported that independent election observers have not registered any instance of “fraud” or “irregularity”, in Al Jazeera English’s interview with Erfin Dewi Sudanto — the candidate of the National Mandate Party in Banyuwangi in East Java — Erfin acknowledged the fact that securing “tips,” which is slang for buying votes, formed part of his campaign strategy. While vote buying is illegal under Indonesian law, vote buying remains a common practice since, as Erfin noted, “No one is enforcing the law. The General Election Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU) seems to fall on deaf ears.”6
According to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, leading researcher and executive director of Indikator Politik Indonesia, “at least a third of Indonesian voters had been offered voting incentives, such as money, or food like rice or cooking oil, either ‘very often,’ ‘often,’ or ‘rarely’.” Echoing Muhtadi’s findings, Nairn did not mince words, writing that “the levers of state power are playing a pivotal role in the campaign. Local officials are being threatened with prosecution if they do not back the general. And across the country, army and police are instructing people to vote for Prabowo, a directive with special weight for poorer people who live at their mercy. Government-distributed bags of rice and cooking oil are turning up across the country with Prabowo stickers. Families who need to get the provisions must sometimes pick them up at Prabowo campaign offices.”7
“…WITHOUT MILITARY POWER A NATION WILL BE CRUSHED LIKE GAZA”
Given “Jokowi’s” strategy of remaining independent of either China’s or the US’ influence, even experts and insiders are, themselves, unsure and acknowledge that they can only wait and see what “America’s ‘fair-haired boy’” has in store for Indonesia, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. For instance, given Indonesia’s long standing relations with both the US and China, “China [remains] by far [Indonesia’s] №1 trading partner, №1 foreign investor and, before the pandemic, the №1 source of international tourists” (with the United States coming in a close second ($31.6B), followed by Japan ($26.6B), India ($25.3B), and Malaysia ($15.6B)). Regarding trade policy, Prabowo has gone on record and promised to continue Jokowi’s economic approach — i.e. “a mix of export bans and domestic incentives to force foreign companies to process metals in Indonesia.” Indonesia’s ties with China should prove beneficial for Prabowo, whose stated aim of 7 percent GDP growth will necessitate sizable amounts of foreign investment. This, however, should not be taken as a fait accompli regarding Indonesia’s allegiance to either rival superpower vying for the position of global hegemon.
During his time as Defense Minister, not only did Prabowo oversee the “the largest military exercise between the US and Indonesia,” and the expansion of the Super Garuda Shield exercise, “should there be clashes in the South China Sea,” Prabowo’s “sovereigntist instincts could disrupt” Indonesia’s closening of ties with China. According to Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman, associate professor at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani (West Java), while it may b reasonable to expect a pragmatic policy approach from Prabowo, “all bets are off if it [is] something concerning Indonesia’s sovereignty in the South China Sea, like the Philippines is seeing.” Echoing Dr. Yohanes’ sentiment, Dr. Shafiah Muhibat, deputy executive director for research at Indonesia’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), views continuity, rather than discontinuity, following the transition of power with Prabowo’s October inauguration. That said, adds Dr. Muhibat, “this man [Prabowo] is absolutely unpredictable, and we don’t know who’s advising him.” Prabowo’s opening statement during the presidential debate on 7 January only further added to this air of unpredictability:
The first function of the nation is to protect, meaning defense, brothers […] We understand our country is very large, very rich. For hundreds of years countries from far away came to this archipelago to intervene, to interfere, to bring conflict, and to steal our wealth. Until we were independent, we also had to deal with our natural wealth being taken cheaply […] National power must be military power […] Without military power, the history of human civilization will teach us that a nation will be crushed like Gaza is currently.8
Remarks such as these fail to provide some clarity regarding Prabowo’s actual intentions, and, thus, have left very few insiders with any real sense “as to what such rhetoric will actually amount [to].”
For journalist Joseph Rachman, not only was Prabowo’s mentioning of Israel’s ongoing genocide Gaza no accident; Palestine could be one of the issues where one may see Prabowo depart from Jokowi’s orthodoxy. As Rachman notes, “the Indonesian Foreign Ministry has long taken a strong line on the issue, and Indonesia has never entertained diplomatic relations with Israel.” For example, in light of Australia’s 2018 decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem, Prabowo simply remarked on “the need to respect Australia’s sovereign decisions.” What is more, adds Rachman, Indonesia’s military has “enjoyed cordial backchannel relations with Israeli counterparts” for quite some time, which, as Rachman notes, “may explain Prabowo’s unusual instincts on the matter.” That said, Prabowo’s response pales in comparison to Jokowi’s resolute support for Palestine. In a statement regarding last January’s UN Security Council’s open debate, Jokowi took the opportunity to voice Indonesia’s uncompromising support of Palestine and went so far as to repeat his position for the sake of clarity for the rest of the international community: “I want to emphasize that ports in Indonesia will not be used to serve Israel’s interests. That’s non-negotiable.”9 And so, while a Prabowo presidency remains unclear to the most informed observers, to diplomats and foreign investors alike, Dr. Yohanes had this to say: “Don’t offend him and offer a lot of support and he will be your best friend for the next five or ten years.”
ENDNOTES
1. Allan Nairn, ‘Indonesia State Apparatus Is Preparing To Throw Election To A Notorious Massacre General,’ The Intercept (10 February 2024).
2. However, following Prabowo’s most recently failed election bid, and in a rather surprising turn for the outgoing head of state, “Jokowi” appointed Prabowo as his Minister of Defense in 2020.
3. Allan Nairn, ‘Indonesia State Apparatus Is Preparing To Throw Election To A Notorious Massacre General,’ The Intercept (10 February 2024).
4. Allan Nairn, ‘Indonesia State Apparatus Is Preparing To Throw Election To A Notorious Massacre General,’ The Intercept (10 February 2024).
5. Dana Priest, ‘U.S.-Trained United Suspected of Torture,’ Washington Post (23 May 1998). Accessed on 11 March 2024.
6. Febriana Firdaus, ‘A kidney for votes: Candidates struggle with Indonesian election costs,’ Al Jazeera English (12 February 2024)
7. Allan Nairn, ‘Indonesia State Apparatus Is Preparing To Throw Election To A Notorious Massacre General,’ The Intercept (10 February 2024).
8. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, cited in Joseph Rachman, ‘What Prabowo’s Victory Means For Indonesian Foreign Policy,’ The Diplomat (7 march 2024). Emphasis added.
9. Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, ‘Statement of President of the Republic of Indonesia concerning Support for Palestine, at the Bogor Presidential Palace, West Java Province,’ Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia (26 January 2024). Emphasis added.
